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This paper first argues that we can bring out a tension between the following three
popular doctrines: (i) the canonical reduction of metaphysical modality to essence,
due to Fine, (ii) contingentism, which says that possibly something could have
failed to be something, and (iii) the doctrine that metaphysical modality obeys the
modal logic S5. After presenting two such arguments (one from the theorems of S4
and another from the theorems of B), I turn to exploring various conclusions we
might draw in light of these results, and argue that none comes cost-free. In the
course of laying out possible responses to my arguments, we’ll have a chance to
evaluate various doctrines about the interplay between contingency and essence, as
well as develop some alternative reductions of metaphysical modality to essence.
I don’t come down decisively in favour of one response over the others, though I
say some things that point towards the conclusion that essence has no role to play
in reducing metaphysical modality.
1. Introduction
My goal in this paper is to bring out a tension for proponents of
reducing metaphysical modality to essence, and to explore various
morals we might take away from this result. Roughly for now, our
tension will arise from the following three popular doctrines:
. S5: Metaphysical modality obeys the modal logic S5.
. Contingentism: Possibly something could have failed to exist
(where throughout the paper unqualified uses of modal locu-
tions, including ‘h’ and ‘S’, should be understood as express-
ing metaphysical modality).
. Modality to Essence: Metaphysical modality reduces to essence
in the canonical way, due to Fine (1994)—we’ll spell out the
reduction below.
One response to our result is to hold onto the canonical under-
standing of the reduction to essence, and so view our discussion as an
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argument either against S5 or against Contingentism. Either way,
we’d have an interesting upshot: proponents of the canonical reduc-
tion to essence must adopt a non-standard view about the logic of
metaphysical modality, or else they are committed to necessitism, the
doctrine that necessarily everything necessarily exists (the negation of
contingentism). A second line of response, which we’ll spend the most
time with, is to reject the canonical understanding of the reduction to
essence, but to try to come up with some modified version of the
reduction that is consistent with S5 and Contingentism (throughout
we’ll use ‘canonical reduction’ to describe the version of the reduction
to essence presented in Fine 1994, which is the version that is almost
universally under discussion in the literature). We’ll look at two al-
ternative reductions of modality to essence that might do the trick.
Even those already inclined to reject S5 or Contingentism should have
something to gain from this discussion, which bears on the project of
reducing modality to essence more generally, even setting aside our
arguments. A third line of response would be to hold onto S5 and
Contingentism yet reject any modifications of the canonical reduction
to essence, and so view our discussion as an argument against any kind
of reduction of modality to essence. The alternatives to the canonical
reduction that we’ll see all have problems of their own, so this third
line of response has some plausibility. Finally, we’ll see other lines of
response stemming from the different assumptions we’ll need in our
arguments, which point to some controversial new theses about what’s
essential to what.
Here my main aim is to bring out the tension between our initial
doctrines and evaluate the possible replies, rather than try to decisively
come down in favour of one reply over the others, though I’ll say some
things that point towards the strong conclusion that essence has no
role to play in reducing metaphysical modality. Nonetheless, the brief
sketch we just gave of some of the different replies to our arguments
already shows that no reply comes cost-free, and so our arguments
have interesting upshots no matter which way we go.
We’ll get to our arguments in §3. First, let’s spell out exactly what
the three initial doctrines say.
2. The three doctrines
Starting with S5, the two axiom schemas of S5 we’ll show to be in
tension with Contingentism and Modality to Essence are the 4
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schema, that what’s necessary is necessarily necessary, and the B
schema, that what’s the case is necessarily possible. Given that the
logics S4 and B each suffice to bring out the tension, our argument
in fact employs only the strictly weaker assumption that metaphysical
modality obeys either the modal logic S4 or the modal logic B. Still, it
will be illustrative to see how the tension arises for both S4 and B, each
of which brings out different issues. So we’ll present two separate
arguments, one from the theorems of S4 and another from the the-
orems of B, which strengthens our claim that there’s a real tension
here. The theorems of S5 are widely regarded as non-negotiable con-
straints governing metaphysical modality. Moreover, the main objec-
tions to S5 target only instances of the 4 schema (and its
necessitations) as genuine constraints, and these objections don’t
extend to the theorems of B. So advocates of these objections at
best avoid our argument from the theorems of S4, but still must ad-
dress our argument from the theorems of B.1
I’ll use universal quantification into sentence position to express
what it means for metaphysical modality to obey some constraint
embodied in some modal schema or logic. For example, we’ll say
that metaphysical modality ‘obeys’ or ‘is governed by ’ the T-
schema, that what’s necessary is the case, if and only if 8pð«p ! pÞ,
where this latter formula, with its sentential quantifier, is part of the
language in which we’re conducting our discussion, not the propos-
itional or first-order modal languages usually under discussion when
presenting the familiar modal logics. (For the general method for
moving from some theorem of some logic to the relevant universally
quantified statement, and some rationale for this method, see the
1 The main objections to S5 alluded to in the main text stem from the ‘modal sorites’
arguments against the 4 schema as a constraint governing metaphysical modality, due to
Chandler (1976) and further elaborated by Salmon (1981, pp. 229–52; 1989). But these argu-
ments remain controversial, and most still subscribe to S5. For a sampling of some attempts to
respond to these arguments, see Williamson (1990, §8.3), Hawthorne (2006, p. 241 n.8), Leslie
(2011), and Murray and Wilson (2012). Another potential source of resistance to S5 stems from
counterpart theory, which some, including Lewis (1968, pp. 123–4), take to show that neither
the 4 schema nor the B schema embodies a constraint governing metaphysical modality.
(Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.) However, (i) counterpart theorists
disagree as to whether their view, properly understood, carries these revisionary logical con-
sequences, (ii) on some ways of implementing counterpart theory, the programme is com-
mitted to a reduction of modality in terms of first-order quantification over some additional
ontology, and so won’t offer solace to proponents of the canonical reduction to essence
looking for a way to hold onto their view in light of our arguments, and (iii) counterpart
theory remains a controversial programme that has been criticized on several fronts. See Dorr
(MS) for extensive discussion of these three issues and an evaluation of some of the problems
facing counterpart theory.
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discussion of ‘metaphysical universality ’ in Williamson 2013, ch. 3.)
We could have stuck with schematic statements of various modal
principles throughout, using only particular instances to derive our
tension (and those who prefer to do so won’t have trouble recasting
our discussion in this mode), but universal quantification into sen-
tence position captures the generality implicit when we claim that
metaphysical modality obeys or is governed by some schema or
logic, and allows us to bring out our tension in full generality without
being bound by the expressive resources of any particular language.
There’s a vexed issue about how to interpret higher-order quantifica-
tion (where quantification into sentence position is just 0-adic
higher-order quantification), whether in terms of substitutional quan-
tification relative to some idealized language, as restricted first-order
quantification over some special kind of objects (such as properties,
propositions or sets), or as an irreducible form of quantification
whose interpretation can be given only in a metalanguage that itself
employs higher-order resources. We can stay neutral on this issue,
which is orthogonal to the tension I’m bringing out here (though
I’ve set aside interpretations in terms of plural quantification, which
arguably can’t do justice to quantification into sentence position or to
how higher-order quantifiers interact with modal operators). For con-
venience I’ll generally write as if quantification into sentence position
is just first-order quantification over propositions, which simplifies
some of the exposition in what follows, though nominalists who
don’t think there are any propositions can paraphrase away ‘propos-
ition’ talk using higher-order quantifiers and interpreting such quan-
tifiers using one of the alternatives to the first-order interpretation
(the same is true of our use of ‘property ’ talk later on).2
Contingentism is the negation of necessitism, the doctrine that
necessarily everything necessarily exists (for a defence of necessitism
see especially Williamson 2013). You might think that necessitism is
obviously false; for instance, you might think, ‘Surely it’s possible that
my parents never met, in which case I wouldn’t have been born and so
wouldn’t have existed’. These sorts of worries aren’t decisive, given the
sense of ‘existence’ at issue in the debate between necessitists and
contingentists. For Williamson, ordinary uses of ‘existence’ generally
express properties like being concrete, or being located in spacetime,
2 See Williamson (2013, pp. 235–61) for a survey of some of these different options for
interpreting higher-order quantification, citations to relevant literature, and a defence of the
view that we shouldn’t try to reduce higher-order quantification to anything else.
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and Williamson is happy to grant that having these properties is a
contingent matter. But Williamson’s necessitism is a doctrine
about what he calls the ‘logician’s sense of existence’, according to
which ‘x exists’ =df 9yðx ¼ yÞ, where here the quantifier is absolutely
unrestricted. We’ll follow Williamson from now on in using ‘is some-
thing’ and ‘has being’ interchangeably to express this notion, which
will ensure that it doesn’t get conflated with more ordinary uses of
‘exists’. Williamson’s diagnosis of the worry a few sentences back is
that the objection conflates these different senses of ‘existence’: al-
though if you hadn’t been born you wouldn’t have been concrete or
located in spacetime, for necessitists you would still have been some-
thing, a contingently non-concrete entity. So we see that necessitism
isn’t immediately refuted; nonetheless, the doctrine is hotly contested,
and contingentism remains the default position.
Finally, Modality to Essence refers to the canonical reduction to
essence presented in Fine’s 1994 paper, which is currently one of the
most popular candidate reductions of metaphysical modality.3 Here’s
the idea. First, Fine (1994) presents well-known arguments for think-
ing that essence can’t be reduced to familiar modal notions and so we
should recognize a non-modal notion of essence (where throughout
the paper we’ll use ‘non-modal’ to mean ‘not reducible to familiar
modal notions’). Taking these arguments on board, he then suggests
that we can reverse the standard order of priority by using this non-
modal notion of essence to reduce various modal notions. The non-
modal notion of essence gives us, for any object o, a class of propos-
itions essential to o; call this class o’s essence. For example, Sanders’
essence arguably includes the proposition that Sanders is self-identical
if Sanders is something, the proposition that Sanders is human if
Sanders is something, and so on. We’re more used to thinking of
objects having certain properties essentially, rather than certain
3 In a recent survey of reductions of metaphysical modality, Cameron (2010) includes the
reduction to essence as one of what he regards as the three most promising options, the other
two being modal realism and neo-conventionalism. For some authors who have adopted Fine’s
reduction to essence and continued working on the idea, see Hale (1996), Correia (2006, 2012),
Rosen (2006), and Dasgupta (2016). Note that throughout the paper we’ll ignore distinctions
between different notions of essence and modifications of the original reduction that don’t
bear on our tension (such as those that appeal to grounding or a notion of consequence
relative to some familiar background logic), though we’ll discuss potentially relevant modifi-
cations later on, including one suggested by Fine’s formal work on the reduction to essence.
See Fine (1995b) and the works just cited for more notions of essence and some modifications
of the reduction that don’t bear on our initial tension. Throughout, we’re talking about what
Fine (1995b) calls ‘constitutive immediate essence’, which most closely corresponds to the pre-
theoretical notion.
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propositions being essential to objects (which is required for Fine’s
reduction), but it’s not hard to move from one regimentation to the
other: Fine can interpret talk of some object o having some property F
essentially in terms of the proposition that o is F being essential to o.
Finally, it’s important for Fine’s reduction that not only individual
objects but also pluralities of objects have essences; that is, propos-
itions can be essential to pluralities of objects in addition to individual
objects. For example, Fine might claim that although the proposition
that it’s not the case that Sanders is identical to Clinton is essential to
neither Sanders nor Clinton, the proposition is essential to the plur-
ality consisting of both Sanders and Clinton.
This non-modal notion of essence allows us to define different ne-
cessity operators by looking at different objects or pluralities of ob-
jects, each of which gives rise to a class of propositions (the
propositions essential to the object or plurality of objects). In particu-
lar, Fine contends that if we consider the essences of all objects or
pluralities of objects whatsoever, the resulting necessity operator will
correspond to our familiar notion of metaphysical necessity. So the
resulting reduction says that a proposition p is metaphysically neces-
sary in virtue of there being (unrestrictedly) some object or plurality
of objects such that p is essential to that object or plurality of objects;
we then define metaphysical possibility using the standard dual
equivalence (I’ll comment on the ideology of ‘reduction’ and ‘in
virtue of ’ shortly). This reduction of modality to essence is committed
to the following claim: given any putative metaphysical necessity p,
there is some object or plurality of objects whose essence contains p; in
a slogan, all metaphysical necessities originate from the essences of
things.
Before we get going, we need some notation, which will simplify our
discussion in what follows (note that I’ll continue to ignore use–men-
tion distinctions when doing so won’t lead to any confusion). We’ll
use xx and yy throughout the paper as variables ranging over plural-
ities of objects, where crucially we’ll take this to include the special
case where the plurality contains just a single object, and we’ll use v
for a relation of containment between pluralities, akin to the subset
relation (the exact logic of the containment relation won’t be import-
ant in what follows). Also, throughout, p and q are variables ranging
over propositions. We’ll follow Fine in using «xxp to say that p is
essential to xx (this isn’t exactly Fine’s regimentation, but the differ-
ences won’t matter). So we can state the canonical reduction to es-
sence we just saw, from Fine 1994, as follows: for any p, «p reduces to
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9xxð«xxpÞ. I should flag that this formulation of the reduction may at
first appear importantly different from Fine’s own, which says that a
proposition p is metaphysically necessary in virtue of p being essential
to the plurality of all objects whatsoever, that is, «p reduces to
9xx8yyðyyvxx ^ «xxpÞ. However, Fine takes essence to be monotonic:
necessarily, for any p, xx, and yy, if «xxp and xxvyy, then «yyp. To get
a feel for this assumption, consider the proposition that Sanders is
self-identical if Sanders is something, and suppose that the propos-
ition is essential to Sanders. Then given monotonicity, the proposition
is also essential to the plurality of Sanders and Clinton, the plurality of
Sanders, Clinton and the White House, and also to any other plurality
that contains Sanders. More generally, given the monotonicity as-
sumption, any proposition essential to any object or plurality of ob-
jects will also be essential to the plurality of all objects whatsoever. As a
result, Fine’s formulation of the canonical reduction becomes neces-
sarily co-extensive with ours. I started with my formulation because I
find it gives a clearer picture of how the canonical reduction to essence
works, and doesn’t prejudge the issue of monotonicity, but for our
purposes we could instead adopt monotonicity and use Fine’s formu-
lation, so moving forward I’ll switch to Fine’s formulation when doing
so simplifies the discussion.
3. The tension
3.1 Some preliminaries
Now that we have our three doctrines and our notation on the table,
let’s turn to showing why the three doctrines are in tension with one
another. I’ve continually referred to our argument as a ‘tension’ rather
than an inconsistency, because we need to go beyond our three initial
doctrines to get things going, but each of these additional steps is hard
to resist, so the three doctrines that we started out with will remain the
most promising places to try to block our argument. As a quick pre-
view of what’s to come, given the canonical reduction to essence,
what’s necessary or possible reduces to the essences of what objects
there are. Given contingentism, possibly it’s contingent what objects
there are. We’ll see shortly that, combining these two claims, it’s not
hard to show that this possible contingency in what objects there are
gives rise to possible contingency in what’s necessary or possible. But
we’ll see that from this result we can derive a contradiction provided
metaphysical modality obeys either the modal logic S4 or the modal
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logic B (we’ll present two arguments, one that employs the assump-
tion about S4 and another that employs the assumption about B). So
something has to give. Let’s first spell out the additional doctrines
we’ll need to make these arguments, and then present the arguments
more carefully.
First, our arguments will rely on the following doctrine:
Robustness: If the canonical reduction to essence is true, then it’s
necessarily true, necessarily necessarily true, and so on for all
iterated necessitations of the reduction.
Given S4, robustness is equivalent to the doctrine that the canonical
reduction to essence is necessarily true if true at all. So far we’ve made
free use of the ideology of ‘reduction’, and related ideology like ‘in
virtue of ’. All we need to assume here is that under any way of cashing
out this ideology, the reduction to essence purports to tell us what it is
for a proposition to be necessary, where we understand this latter
demand to imply the modal strength embodied in robustness. These
‘What is X?’ questions are as old as philosophy itself, and I won’t
attempt to catalogue the different possible things we might mean by
these sorts of questions. Still, I think it’s uncontroversial that there’s
an interesting and prominent reading of questions like ‘What is it to
be a law of nature?’, ‘What is it to be a proton?’, and, our focus here,
‘What is it to be necessary?’, according to which adequate answers
must be non-contingent, and moreover that this reading is what’s
standardly at issue in philosophical contexts. Apart from this assump-
tion, our discussion can stay neutral on exactly what ideology is
involved in giving a reduction of modality (whether ‘grounding’,
Sider’s (2011) ‘metaphysical semantics’, Dorr’s (2016) ‘identifications’,
and so on): robustness remains a plausible doctrine whichever way we
go.
Second, our arguments will rely not on contingentism itself, but on
the following closely related doctrine:
Standard Contingentism: Some proposition p is possibly both
essential to some xx and possibly essential to nothing; that is,
9pSð9xxð«xxpÞ ^ S‰9xxð«xxpÞÞ.
Standard contingentism implies contingentism given the plausible as-
sumption that, for any proposition p, necessarily if p is essential to
some xx then necessarily if everything contained in xx is something
then p is essential to xx. But the converse fails: contingentism strictly
speaking leaves open that although possibly it’s contingent what there
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is, this contingency never affects which propositions are essential to
some xx or other. Still, most contingentists will also accept standard
contingentism, and rightly so. For example, it’s generally accepted that
given any two objects, it’s essential to those objects taken together that
it’s not the case that the first is identical to the second. So let’s assume
that it’s essential to Sanders taken together with Clinton that it’s not
the case that Sanders is identical to Clinton (hence necessarily it’s not
the case that Sanders is identical to Clinton given the reduction to
essence). Contingentists will also maintain that each of Sanders and
Clinton could have failed to be something (though we could run an
analogous example provided the contingentist takes any objects to be
only contingently something). So non-standard contingentists must
maintain that even if both Sanders and Clinton had failed to be some-
thing, there couldn’t have failed to be some xx such that it’s essential
to xx that it’s not the case that Sanders is identical to Clinton. Yet it’s
not clear what this xx could be for contingentists. With some imagin-
ation we can conceive of a coherent non-standard contingentist: there
could be a contingentist who maintains that although possibly it’s
contingent what there is (for example, she holds that Sanders and
Clinton each could have failed to be something), there is nonetheless
some deity, a spaghetti monster perhaps, that is necessarily something,
and such that, for any proposition p, necessarily if p is essential to
some xx then p is also essential to this deity. So for this non-standard
contingentist, even if Sanders and Clinton had each failed to be some-
thing, the proposition that it’s not the case that Sanders is identical to
Clinton would nonetheless be essential to this deity. We’ll see a more
plausible version of non-standard contingentism later on (which ap-
peals to properties that are necessarily something), but the view still
won’t have much to recommend it. So it’s safe to say that most
contingentists will also be standard contingentists, holding that pos-
sible contingency in what there is gives rise to possible contingency in
what’s essential to some xx or other, and we’ll take the implication
from the one doctrine to the other on board for the time being.
3.2 The tension with S4
Let’s start with the tension with S4. We’ll derive an inconsistency
from: (i) the doctrine that metaphysical modality obeys the modal
logic S4, (ii) the canonical reduction of modality to essence, (iii)
standard contingentism (which we’re taking for granted all contingen-
tists will want to accept), and (iv) robustness. Note that even though,
given our assumptions, all expressions of metaphysical modality are to
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be understood in accord with the canonical reduction to essence, I’ll
still often use unsubscripted modal operators for readability (though
feel free to substitute the canonical reduction to essence stated above
for ‘h’ and the reduction’s dual for ‘S’ throughout).
From standard contingentism, we have that 9pSð9xxð«xxpÞ^
S‰9xxð«xxpÞÞ. So, given the reduction to essence and robustness,
we have that 9pSð«p ^ S‰«pÞ, i.e. 9pS‰ð«p ! ««pÞ. But the
modal logic S4 has the rule of necessitation: embodied in the doctrine
that metaphysical modality obeys the modal logic S4 is not only that
what’s necessary is necessarily necessary, but that this couldn’t have
failed to be the case. So we have that 8p«ð«p ! ««pÞ, which contra-
dicts what we’ve just derived.
It’s not hard to get a picture for what’s going on in this abstract
derivation. For instance, contingentists will maintain that Sanders
could have failed to be something (this isn’t implied by their view
of course, but generally contingentists hold much stronger views about
what could have failed to be something beyond what contingentism
officially implies), or equivalently, given the reduction to essence, that
the essences of everything there is leave open that Sanders fails to be
something. Let q be the proposition that Sanders is human if Sanders
is something. Then q is essential to Sanders, and hence necessary given
the reduction to essence. But if Sanders were to fail to be something,
then arguably q wouldn’t have been essential to anything at all, for
reasons we already saw when motivating standard contingentism: if
Sanders were to fail to be something then what xx would there have
been that’s essentially such that Sanders is human if Sanders is some-
thing? (Again, we’ll consider ways to reject the implication from con-
tingentism to standard contingentism later on.) As a result, given the
reduction to essence, q is necessary but possibly not necessary, that is,
not necessarily necessary, which contradicts the 4 schema.
3.3 The tension with B
Turning now to the argument that uses the modal logic B instead of
S4, here things are less straightforward. An advantage of the argument
from S4 is that we were able to stay relatively neutral about what’s
essential to what. We needed to assume only that essences don’t rule
out standard contingentism—so roughly, for some proposition p, the
essences of what there is leave open that (i) p is essential to some xx,
(ii) the essences of what there is at this possibility leave open that
something contained in xx fails to be something, and (iii) p would be
essential to nothing if something contained in xx were to fail to be
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something. The tension with B instead of S4 requires one additional
substantive assumption about what’s essential to what.
In particular, here’s what we need to assume about essence to get
the tension with B going:
ðÞ 8p«ð9xxð«xxpÞ ! «ð‰9xxð«xxpÞ ! ‰9xxð«xxSpÞÞÞ
This says that there cannot be any xx whose essence contains Sp but
no xx whose essence contains p, provided p is essential to some xx
(and that, for any proposition, necessarily this claim obtains). To the
extent that I have a grip on such matters, ðÞ strikes me as the sort of
claim that those who go in for the notion of essence should find
attractive, though I also recognize some pictures where it turns out
false. Note that anyone who accepts ðÞ would likely accept a much
more general doctrine about essence from which ðÞ follows; for in-
stance, the picture thinking I’ll use to motivate ðÞ below predicts that
we should also accept the whole range of principles that arise by
substituting any string of modal operators for the possibility operator
in the final consequent of ðÞ, and also all iterated necessitations of any
of these principles. But I’ve stated the principle in the particular form
that will be relevant for our argument below from B.4
4 In fact, the universal claim ðÞ is stronger than what we need to run an argument against
the theorems of B as constraints governing metaphysical modality: we can get a counterex-
ample given only the weaker claim that ðÞ holds of some proposition that can also witness the
truth of standard contingentism. I focus on ðÞ itself in the main text because visions of
essence that predict ðÞ strike me as the most principled motivations for the weaker claim
we actually need, and I suspect most proponents of the canonical reduction will go in for
visions of this kind. That being said, the fact that we can run an argument against B using only
the weaker claim is dialectically relevant for proponents of the canonical reduction with some
non-standard metaphysical commitments. In particular, proponents of the reduction can ar-
guably reject ðÞ provided they buy into the Chandler-Salmon argument against S4, that is,
buy into the flexibility of material origins thesis yet reject any of the standard responses to the
argument (see the works cited in footnote 1 for some discussion of this thesis and some
responses to the Chandler-Salmon argument). This result would be dialectically awkward if
we needed to rely on ðÞ itself to argue against B, because proponents of the Chandler-Salmon
argument against S4 are among those for whom the argument against B is especially relevant.
I won’t go through exactly how to generate an objection to ðÞ from this package of com-
mitments, but it suffices to point out that this heterodox combination of views doesn’t offer a
way to reject the weaker claim we could rely on instead. To motivate the weaker claim we
must point to a plausible witness of standard contingentism and argue that ðÞ holds of it. For
example, let p be the proposition that it’s not the case that Sanders is identical to Clinton,
which we saw above is arguably a witness of standard contingentism. If so, we know that p
would be essential to nothing if Sanders and Clinton were nothing. Now to motivate the
weakened version of ðÞ we just need to argue that Sp would also be essential to nothing if
Sanders and Clinton were nothing, which we can do using particular instances of the general
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The initial conditional antecedent in ðÞ, restricting our attention to
propositions that are essential to some xx, is intended to rule out the
following sort of counterexamples. Consider the proposition that
Sanders stands if Sanders is something: it’s essential to nothing
(standing is a merely accidental property of Sanders), but someone
might claim that Sanders is essentially such that he’s a possible stander
if he’s something, it’s ‘part of what it is to be him’ that he can stand.
The more complicated ðÞ is compatible with this view, so long as
necessarily nothing is essentially such that Sanders stands if Sanders is
something, because ðÞ’s initial antecedent ensures that the claim
vacuously holds for propositions that aren’t possibly essential to
some xx.
Here’s an example of the picture thinking that would support a prin-
ciple like ðÞ. Some claim that a proposition p is essential to some xx just
in case p ‘tells us what it is to be xx’ or ‘tells us what xx is in its very
nature’. (Those who like the ideology of essence generally use these sorts
of pre-theoretical glosses to warm us up to the notion; see the citations
in footnote 3 for some examples.) Now combine this picture thinking
with the further idea that, for any p that is possibly essential to some xx
(and so avoiding counterexamples from accidental propositions just
mentioned), if there is no xx such that p stands in these special relations
to xx, i.e. there is no xx such that p tells us ‘what it is to be xx’, then there
is no xx such that Sp stands in these special relations to xx. This idea has
some plausibility. For instance, if there’s no xx such that ‘part of what it
is to be xx’ is for Sanders to be human if Sanders is something (and so
no Sanders), then this idea says there’s also no xx such that ‘part of what
it is to be xx’ is for Sanders to be possibly human if Sanders is something
(from now on I’ll drop the ‘if something’ qualifier when it won’t be
relevant). This claim immediately follows provided any candidate xx
with an essence in which we might source the proposition that
Sanders is possibly human would also be an xx that’s essentially such
that Sanders is human, which has some pre-theoretical pull. If we com-
bine the two claims in this paragraph (assuming that if the claims are
plausible then they hold non-contingently), we get ().
The picture thinking in the previous paragraph has some plausibil-
ity, but I recognize that there could be other doctrines about how
essence behaves according to which () comes out false. These
would be doctrines according to which some xx that propositions
principles I’ll use in the main text to motivate ðÞ itself. Thanks to Jake Nebel for helpful
discussions here.
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like Sp are essential to needn’t contain any yy that p itself is essential
to, nor bear some other relation to any yy that p itself is essential to
which implies that xx can’t be something unless yy is also something.
Returning to our previous example, let q be the proposition that
Sanders is human if Sanders is something. Then someone might con-
tend that even if q were essential to nothing (and so Sanders were
nothing), Sq would still be essential to the concept of essence, which
couldn’t have failed to be something (recall that we’re using S to
abbreviate the more complicated statement of metaphysical modality
in terms of essence).5 Alternatively, someone might contend that the
property of being Sanders could be something even if Sanders were
nothing, and that at such possibilities q is essential to nothing but Sq
is still essential to the property of being Sanders. I think these pictures
arguably go against some of the pre-theoretical glosses which were
supposed to help us understand this ideology of essence to begin
with. Against the first, even Sq seems still in some sense to be
about Sanders, and tell us something about what it is to be him,
not about what it is to be the concept of essence. Against the
second, although I can sometimes get into a frame of mind where
both q and Sq are essential to the property of being Sanders (assuming
for now that there is such a property that could be something even if
Sanders were nothing), I’m not sure what principled motivation in-
herent in the ideology of essence supports a picture where Sq but not
also q itself is essential to the property. (The option of saying that both
q and Sq are essential to the property of being Sanders wouldn’t offer
a way to reject (), but points towards a way to defend non-standard
contingentism, provided the property is necessarily something, a re-
sponse we’ll discuss later on.)
Despite having just made a tentative case for () and against two
competing pictures, I don’t want to put much weight on these issues
either way. Once we move to these complex principles about what’s
essential to what, I start to lose my grip on the notion of essence, and
don’t have firm judgements one way or the other. I do think () has a
lot going for it, but I wouldn’t want to lean too heavily on the picture
thinking that supports the principle. We’ll take () on board moving
forward, which we need to run our argument from B. Even if a pro-
ponent of the reduction to essence could come up with an argument
5 If we heed Correia’s (2006) distinction between ‘objectual’ and ‘generic’ essence, we
should replace ‘the concept of essence’ here with ‘what it is to be essence’, understood as
irreducibly second-order, but I’ll ignore this distinction throughout because it doesn’t affect
any of our arguments.
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against (), we could still fall back on our argument from S4 outlined
above. Moreover, the result that proponents of the reduction to es-
sence are committed to denying () in order to save B (and hence S5)
would be an interesting result in its own right. The negation of ()
embodies a substantive constraint on how essence behaves, and I sus-
pect that any picture according to which () is false will come with
commitments of its own, so denying () is certainly more than you
might have initially thought was needed in order to adequately im-
plement the canonical reduction to essence.
Taking () on board, let’s show how the tension arises between our
various doctrines. In particular, we’ll derive an inconsistency from: (i)
(), (ii) the doctrine that metaphysical modality obeys the modal logic
B, (iii) the canonical reduction of modality to essence, (iv) standard
contingentism (which we’re still taking for granted any contingentist
will want to accept), and (v) robustness.
The set-up is similar to that with the 4 schema, but the derivation is
a bit more involved. Again, from standard contingentism we have:
ð1Þ 9pSð9xxð«xxpÞ ^ S‰9xxð«xxpÞÞ
Combining (1) with () and standard modal reasoning (valid even in
K and hence B), we can derive:
ð2Þ 9pSð9xxð«xxpÞ ^ S‰9xxð«xxpÞ ^ «ð‰9xxð«xxpÞ ! ‰9xxð«xxSpÞÞÞ
From (2), again with standard modal reasoning, we can derive:
ð3Þ 9pSð9xxð«xxpÞ ^ S‰9xxð«xxSpÞÞ
Finally, from (3), using the canonical reduction of modality to essence
and robustness, we have:
ð4Þ 9pSð«p S^‰«SpÞ, i:e: 9pS‰ð«p ! ««SpÞ
But it’s a theorem of B that necessarily what’s necessary is necessarily
necessarily possible, so we have that 8p«ð«p ! ««SpÞ, which
contradicts what we’ve just derived.
Having spelled out our arguments, let’s now consider some possible
replies.6
6 I should mention briefly that we can run arguments related to the two we presented in
this section that start from the temporal analogue of contingentism (that at some time some-
thing at some time fails to be something). A proper exploration of the temporal setting would
require another paper, but many of the issues we discuss for the modal setting and their
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4. Moving forward
We’ve seen that given some attractive additional assumptions, com-
bining contingentism, the canonical reduction of modality to essence,
and the doctrine that metaphysical modality is governed by either the
modal logic S4 or B, we get a contradiction. The plan for the rest of the
paper is to explore various morals we might take away from these
results. All of these conclusions will be contested views, and none
comes cost-free. Along the way we’ll also evaluate various doctrines
about the interplay between contingency and essence, try to come up
with an attractive non-standard contingentist picture, and develop
some alternative reductions of modality to essence. So much of
what follows will be of interest even independently of the arguments
we just gave.
4.1 Abandoning one of our initial doctrines
A concessive reply, mentioned at the outset, would be to just reject
one of the doctrines that got our arguments going: (i) contingentism,
(ii) the doctrine that metaphysical modality is governed by either the
modal logic S4 or B, or (iii) the canonical reduction of modality to
essence.
The first option of rejecting contingentism would be to embrace
Williamson’s necessitism, and accept that necessarily everything is
necessarily something. This reply can be used to block our arguments,
both of which get going by considering possibilities where something
there is fails to be something. For necessitists, necessarily there can be
epicycles pop up again in almost exactly the same form, though of course there are also
important disanalogies between the two settings. The main principles we need to get the
temporal arguments off the ground are that what’s possible is always possible and that
what’s necessary is always necessary (i.e., nothing impossible ever happens); see Dorr and
Goodman (forthcoming) for a defence of these compelling connections between modality
and time. Combining these principles with the canonical reduction to essence and the tem-
poral analogue of contingentism, we can derive an inconsistency. I won’t rigorously state the
temporal arguments here, nor explore the various additional assumptions we need to get the
arguments going and possible replies. But very roughly, the temporal arguments try to move
from variation in what there is across time, to variation in what’s essential to what across time,
and finally to variation in what’s necessary and possible across time given the canonical
reduction to essence, which contradicts the two principles connecting modality and time
that we just saw. Still, each of these steps requires additional theses that aren’t immediate.
Ultimately I find the temporal setting less interesting because, unlike the modal setting we’re
focusing on, I suspect many would be happy to accept some of the possible responses to the
temporal arguments. Most notably, I suspect many who reject necessitism would nonetheless
be happy take on its temporal analogue (that always everything is always something), which
can be used to block the temporal arguments.
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no variation in what there is. So, provided necessitists adopt the prin-
ciple that, for any proposition p, necessarily if p is essential to some xx
then necessarily if everything contained in xx is something then p is
essential to xx, their view predicts that there cannot be any contin-
gency in what’s essential to what (and so that standard contingentism
fails), and thus that there cannot be any contingency in what’s neces-
sary or possible given the canonical reduction to essence. As a result,
necessitists can straightforwardly accept the reduction to essence in its
canonical form along with the doctrine that metaphysical modality
obeys the modal logic S5.7
The second concessive option is to reject the theorems of S4 and B
as constraints governing metaphysical modality, and so likely hold
that metaphysical modality is governed only by the modal logic T.
I suspect that most won’t be tempted by this line of response (recall
footnote 1), though I acknowledge it as one possible way forward.
A third concessive option would be to keep the theorems of S5 as
constraints governing metaphysical modality, and also keep contin-
gentism, and so take our discussion as an argument against the ca-
nonical reduction of modality to essence. This reply still leaves open
that some modification of the canonical reduction might avoid our
arguments. However, the modifications we’ll look at later on all face
obstacles, so our discussion lends some support to the stronger con-
clusion that we were mistaken to think essence could somehow be
used to reduce metaphysical modality, whether via the canonical re-
duction or some alternative.
All of these replies in effect concede the thrust of our arguments.
Contingentism, and the view that at least the principles embodied in
the theorems of S4 or B govern metaphysical modality, are each popu-
lar doctrines, so either of the first two concessive replies gives us an
interesting result: we’d have shown that proponents of the canonical
7 Of course, necessitism doesn’t imply the principle in the main text that suffices to block
our arguments. For instance, some necessitists may tie what’s essential to some xx not to
whether xx is something (as we’ve been assuming throughout) but to whether xx is concrete
(where here ‘concrete’ is a placeholder for whatever property the necessitist takes ordinary
judgements about the ‘contingency of existence’ to be tracking). These necessitists would claim
that what’s essential to you is a contingent matter, because despite being necessarily something,
you’re only contingently concrete, and what’s essential to you changes at possibilities where
you’re non-concrete. It’s easy to see that this kind of necessitist picture implies standard
contingentism, and hence is still vulnerable to our arguments. As a result, necessitists with
these commitments who are sympathetic to the canonical reduction to essence must reject S5
or else adopt some other reply to our arguments. I’ll set aside this sort of necessitist in the
main text, and focus only on necessitist pictures that straightforwardly block our arguments.
Thanks to Jeremy Goodman for helpful discussions here.
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reduction to essence must either embrace necessitism or else adopt a
heterodox view about the logic of metaphysical modality. Also, as
mentioned near the outset, the reduction to essence is currently one
of the most popular reductions of metaphysical modality, so the
strong version of the third option would be a striking result.
4.2 Non-standard contingentism
A crucial component of our arguments that proponents of the reduc-
tion to essence might try to resist is the implication from contingent-
ism to standard contingentism. We saw some motivation for thinking
that any contingentist should also be a standard contingentist, but we
acknowledged that the implication isn’t immediate, and that it’s at
least consistent to be a non-standard contingentist (that is, to believe
that although possibly it’s contingent what there is, this contingency
cannot affect which propositions are essential to some xx or other).
We parodied this combination of views before with the example of the
contingentist who believes that even though possibly it’s contingent
what there is, there is nonetheless a deity that is necessarily something,
and such that, for any proposition p, necessarily if p is essential to
some xx then p is also essential to this deity. But can we find a more
tenable non-standard contingentist view?
Here’s the most promising option that I know of, though ultimately
I still don’t think the view has much to recommend it. This non-
standard contingentist combines her contingentism with higher-
order necessitism, the doctrine that necessarily it’s non-contingent
what properties and propositions there are, and also takes on an un-
restricted modal comprehension schema defining what properties
there are. The result is that necessarily there is a plenitude of proper-
ties that are necessarily something. In particular, necessarily, for any-
thing there is, necessarily that thing’s haecceity will be among this
plenitude of properties, where for any object o, o’s haecceity is a prop-
erty that necessarily something instantiates just in case it’s identical to
o. In a slogan, o’s haecceity is the property of being o. (I’m glossing
over various formal details in how we move from an unrestricted
modal comprehension schema to the doctrine that necessarily for
any object necessarily that object’s haecceity is something. Our goal
is just to present this non-standard contingentist option, so the formal
details won’t be relevant; those interested should look at Williamson
2013, ch. 6. Also, this non-standard contingentist may adopt the par-
ticular doctrine about haecceities without accepting higher-order
necessitism or the unrestricted comprehension schema, which
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together imply the doctrine, though the view is more principled when
it flows from a general theory of properties rather than being a doc-
trine peculiar to haecceities.)
So this non-standard contingentist accepts that necessarily every-
thing necessarily has a haecceity. The idea then is to claim that, for any
proposition p, necessarily if p is essential to some xx then p is also
essential to the haecceities of the objects contained in xx.8 Provided
this non-standard contingentist also adopts the principle that, for any
proposition p, necessarily if p is essential to some xx then necessarily if
everything contained in xx is something then p is essential to xx, this
picture gives her exactly what she wanted: she can now claim that even
though possibly it’s contingent what there is, this contingency cannot
affect what’s essential to some xx or other, because, for any propos-
ition p, necessarily if p is essential to some xx then p is also essential to
the haecceities of anything contained in xx, and these haecceities are
necessarily something. Let’s return to our example in the argument
from S4 to see how the view is working. Again let q be the proposition
that Sanders is human if Sanders is something, which for our non-
standard contingentist is essential to both Sanders and his haecceity.
For this non-standard contingentist, even if Sanders were to fail to be
something, his haecceity would still be something, and so q would still
be essential to something, and hence still necessary given the reduction
to essence. So our argument against S4 fails, even given contingentism
and the canonical version of the reduction to essence. The upshot of
this non-standard contingentist picture that appeals to haecceities is
that, necessarily, contingency in what there is makes no difference to
what’s essential to some xx or other, and so our arguments never get
off the ground.
I acknowledge this non-standard contingentist option as a potential
reply to our arguments. Still, there are two important points to keep in
8 I’m writing as if properties, and so haecceities, are themselves objects (i.e. values of first-
order variables). An attractive nominalist-friendly translation of our discussion is to interpret
‘property ’ talk in terms of irreducible higher-order quantification, and make use of Correia’s
distinction between objectual and generic essence (see footnotes 2 and 5 for relevant citations),
but I don’t think this non-standard contingentist can take this route. Her strategy seems to
require countenancing mixed-order pluralities, containing both objects and properties (because
she claims that propositions are essential to both objects and their haecceities), and it’s not
obvious how to understand these pluralities if properties aren’t also values of first-order
variables. So there may be an argument against this non-standard contingentist option starting
from a higher-order conception of properties, but making this argument rigorous raises some
delicate issues that would take us too far afield, so I focus on other arguments in the main
text.
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mind. First, some argue that the doctrine that necessarily everything
necessarily has a haecceity implies necessitism itself. Roughly, these
arguments purport to show that one cannot countenance possibilities
where some object’s haecceity is something but that object is nothing,
because that object must allegedly be something in order for the haec-
ceity to have its unique modal profile.9 It’s unclear exactly how these
arguments are supposed to work, so I don’t want to lean on them
here, but if something in the vicinity of these arguments succeeds then
this non-standard contingentist reply collapses into the reply above
that simply embraces necessitism. Second, I’m happy enough if my
arguments show that proponents of the reduction to essence are com-
mitted to this non-standard contingentist package: this picture where
necessarily everything necessarily has a haecceity, combined with the
doctrine that, for any p, necessarily if p is essential to some xx then p is
also essential to the haecceities of what’s contained in xx, is a very
particular metaphysical vision, and not something that anybody has
taken to be inherent in the canonical reduction of modality to essence.
So if it turns out that this non-standard contingentist picture is ul-
timately the right way forward in light of our arguments then we’d
have a significant result.
4.3 Abandoning the canonical reduction I: ‘mere possibilia’
Throughout we’ve been talking about ‘the canonical reduction of mo-
dality to essence’, which is what we presented above and what we
argued leads to inconsistency. This canonical reduction is the version
of the reduction presented in Fine’s 1994 paper, and what’s almost
universally discussed in the literature under the heading of ‘the re-
duction of modality to essence’. We already mentioned the concessive
reply of taking our discussion to tell against the whole project of trying
to reduce modality to essence. That reply takes for granted that the
canonical reduction is the most promising means of implementing a
reduction to essence. So it’s worth exploring whether there are other
means of reducing modality to essence that might avoid our argu-
ments. We’ll look at two such proposals, in this subsection and the
next.
I should stress that the canonical reduction from his 1994 paper is
arguably not Fine’s informed view: in his more formal presentations
9 See Williamson (2013, ch. 6) for these arguments, and also Fine’s postscript to Prior and
Fine (1977), Adams (1981), McMichael (1983) and Fine (1985) for arguments in a similar spirit
pitched against Plantinga’s theory that allows for uninstantiated haecceities.
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of the reduction to essence, Fine (1995a, 2000) adopts a different ver-
sion of the reduction, which appeals to what he calls ‘possible objects’,
and can be read as rejecting the canonical version of the reduction
usually attributed to him. So arguably Fine himself was aware of the
issues that arise for the canonical reduction, and saw the need for
some kind of modification.
Here’s Fine’s informed picture. When determining whether some
proposition is essential to some xx or other, we don’t look only at
what there ‘actually is’, but rather at ‘all possible objects’, where this
latter class of objects is understood as a proper extension of the former
class. (See, for example, Fine (1995a), where he presents a logic for
essence, including a system E5+ for when ‘the domain is taken to
consist of all metaphysically possible objects’ (p. 250) and then
shows that only the system E5+ allows metaphysical modality on the
reduction to essence to obey S5, claiming that ‘the strengthened system
E5+ yields the correct logic for metaphysical necessity ’ (p. 267).) The
crucial fact here for our purposes is that for Fine necessarily it’s non-
contingent what ‘possible objects’ there are. As a result, if this modi-
fication of the reduction to essence in terms of ‘possible objects’ is
coherent, it provides a way around our arguments for the same rea-
sons that the necessitist can avoid our arguments, outlined above.
Nonetheless, I don’t think this modification of the canonical reduction
offers an attractive response to our arguments.
First, I used scare quotes when presenting the modification, because
I’m sceptical of this ideology of ‘possible objects’ if understood as
more encompassing than every object there is. The ‘possible objects’
are supposed to include both the ‘actual objects’ and the ‘non-actual
objects’, but arguably the ‘actual’ qualifier imposes no restriction on
what there is (see Williamson 2013, ch. 1 for a compelling defence of
this idea and some sceptical discussion of the traditional actualist
versus possibilist debate). If so, then there are no ‘non-actual objects’,
and the ‘possible objects’ turn out to coincide with the ‘actual objects’,
that is, all of the objects there are. So on the most plausible reading of
‘possible objects’, Fine’s view that necessarily it’s non-contingent what
‘possible objects’ there are amounts to a roundabout way of espousing
the necessitist response to our arguments, according to which neces-
sarily it’s non-contingent what objects there are. We already know that
proponents of the canonical reduction to essence who are willing to
adopt necessitism can avoid our arguments; what we’re after now are
ways to implement a reduction to essence that are available to con-
tingentists. To this end, let’s set aside scepticism about the ideology
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and grant that the ‘possible objects’ might go beyond all of the objects
there are; we can argue against this modification of the reduction on
its own terms. (To distinguish this reading of ‘possible objects’ from
the reading where the view collapses into necessitism, call the ‘possible
objects’ that aren’t among the objects there are the ‘merely possible
objects’. So contingentist-friendly understandings of this modified re-
duction purport to avoid our arguments by allowing that propositions
can be essential to ‘merely possible objects’ in addition to whatever
objects there are.)
My main worry here is that the reduction to essence is advertised as
reducing modality to something inherently non-modal (Fine’s non-
modal notion of essence), and indeed the canonical version of the
reduction we’ve been discussing throughout makes good on this
promise. By contrast, the version of the reduction that makes use of
these ‘merely possible objects’ straightforwardly fails to meet this am-
bition, unless somehow this ideology is itself further reduced to some-
thing non-modal. I suspect that the reduction to essence would have
won few adherents if it also had to appeal to the essences of ‘merely
possible objects’ (indeed the phrase ‘possible object’ appears nowhere
in Fine’s original 1994 paper), and that the reduction will ultimately
look much less attractive however this ideology is cashed out. To see
this, let’s look at three accounts of ‘merely possible objects’.
One option appeals to Lewis’ (1986) modal realism, according to
which the ‘actual objects’ are those located in our Lewis-world
(roughly, our spacetime), whereas the ‘merely possible objects’ are
those located in any of the other Lewis-worlds in the modal realist’s
multiverse. But first, it’s hard to imagine anybody willing to take
Lewis’ modal realism seriously and then still wanting to implement
something in the spirit of Fine’s reduction: the central motivation for
modal realism is that it purports to offer a reduction of metaphysical
modality to first-order quantification over Lewis-worlds (or over oc-
cupants of these Lewis-worlds plus some counterpart-theoretic appar-
atus). Second, even granting that talk of ‘all the objects there are’ is
restricted to occupants of our own Lewis-world in ordinary contexts,
modal realism falls foul of the collapsing into necessitism worry above,
provided we can quantify unrestrictedly when stating theses like neces-
sitism. Finally, Lewis’ modal realism is, for good reason, nearly uni-
versally rejected, and so the doctrine doesn’t offer an attractive
modification of the canonical reduction, even if it could somehow
be used to implement a reduction to essence that avoids our argu-
ments. (See Williamson 2013, ch. 1 for some recent objections to modal
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realism, and also a detailed discussion of why modal realists are ar-
guably committed to necessitism.)
Views that cash out ‘merely possible objects’ in terms of some ab-
stract objects like properties, propositions or sets do somewhat better
(see Fine 2003 for a survey and critical discussion of some of these
‘proxy ’ reductions); in particular, some claim that we have good
reason to believe that there are such abstract objects, independently
of any ambition to reduce metaphysical modality to first-order quan-
tification over these objects. Nonetheless, even if a view in this spirit
offers a reduction to essence that avoids our arguments (by appealing
to the essences of these additional abstract objects), this wouldn’t be
because these abstract objects are somehow ‘merely possible’ rather
than just being more of what there is, but rather because these objects
are necessarily something, and so may offer a way to defend non-
standard contingentism given the canonical reduction to essence
and some controversial theses about what’s essential to what. So on
this understanding of ‘merely possible objects’, Fine’s modified reduc-
tion is in fact just the canonical reduction wedded to an ontology that
leaves room to defend non-standard contingentism. We’ve already
seen one such package (recall the non-standard contingentist view
we just saw that appeals to haecceities that are necessarily something),
and points analogous to those made there would apply to similar
pictures that use other abstract objects.10
As a third potential option, in some of Fine’s other writings—see
his postscript to Prior and Fine 1977, as well as Fine 1985 and 2003—he
provides an ‘actualist’-friendly translation procedure to eliminate
quantification over ‘merely possible objects’ using strings of quanti-
fiers and modal operators. For me, this story provides the only coher-
ent account of these ‘merely possible objects’ that are supposedly
distinct from any objects there are; however, the story presupposes
that we have in hand some notion of metaphysical modality, which we
can then put to work in cashing out talk of ‘merely possible objects’,
and so the story does nothing to make the ideology of ‘merely possible
objects’ any more palatable as something we can take for granted when
trying to reduce metaphysical modality. (Indeed, when giving these
reductions, Fine subscribes to modalism or primitivism, the doctrine
10 Thanks to both anonymous referees for their suggestions on the issues discussed in the
previous two paragraphs, and for offering these potential ways to make good on talk of the
essences of ‘merely possible objects’.
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that metaphysical modality is irreducible; see, for example, Fine 2003,
p. 171.)
It’s no surprise, then, that it’s the canonical version of the reduction
to essence, which we’ve been discussing throughout, that many have
wanted to champion. Perhaps the main attraction of Fine’s view is
that it purports to reduce metaphysical modality using only the non-
modal ideology of essence, without the need to take on baggage like
Lewis-worlds or abstract surrogates for ‘merely possible objects’,
including ‘merely possible worlds’. We’ve seen that even granting
that some ‘possible objects’ needn’t be among whatever objects
there are (which is required if the modification of the canonical re-
duction that includes the essences of all ‘possible objects’ is supposed
to offer contingentists a way around our arguments), under extant
ways to try to cash out this ideology the modified reduction faces
significant challenges.
4.4 Abandoning the canonical reduction II: cumulative essences
Let’s look at another possible modification of the canonical reduction
to essence, which I’ll call the ‘cumulative reduction to essence’. As far
as I know, nobody in the literature has suggested a modification of the
reduction along these lines. The proposal offers an interesting poten-
tial reply to our arguments, yet ultimately still faces some major
obstacles.11
First, we need some new notation. We’ll need more than just a few
plural variables, so let’s now also use xx0, xx1, …, yy0, yy1, … as vari-
ables ranging over pluralities of objects (where, as always, this includes
the special case in which the plurality contains only a single object),
just as we were using xx and yy up until this point. And we also need a
device that lets us form new plural terms from old ones; in particular,
where xx0 and xx1 are any pluralities of objects, let xx0txx1 be the
plurality containing all and only the objects contained in either xx0 or
xx1.
Here’s the idea behind the cumulative reduction. First, recall the
canonical reduction to essence (where we’ll use Fine’s original formu-
lation, mentioned in §2, which will simplify the exposition in what
11 The idea behind the cumulative reduction was suggested to me by Kit Fine as a potential
reply to my arguments. I make no claim that the particular way I’ve chosen to develop his
initial suggestion is exactly what he had in mind, or that something in the spirit of the
cumulative reduction is his preferred reply to my arguments. In writing this subsection, I
have benefited greatly from discussions about related issues with Kit Fine, Cian Dorr and
Jeremy Goodman.
Mind, Vol. 00 . 0 . 2017  Teitel 2017
Contingent Existence and the Reduction of Modality to Essence 23
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/mind/fzx001/4609380
by New York University user
on 09 November 2017
follows): «p reduces to 9xx8yyðyyvxx ^ «xxpÞ. More precisely, given
any formula containing any number of metaphysical necessity oper-
ators, we apply this procedure on each operator to arrive at a new
formula, and then the canonical reduction says that the proposition
expressed by the former formula reduces to the proposition expressed
by the latter.
On the cumulative reduction, we use a more complicated proced-
ure. Any formula will contain some finite number, possibly zero, of
occurrences of « (I’ll assume throughout that S is a metalinguistic
abbreviation for ‰«‰, and so we can just discuss metaphysical neces-
sity operators). We can then associate every occurrence of « in a
formula with some finite number of modal depth: an occurrence of
« has modal depth n just in case the occurrence is in the scope of n
other occurrences of «. So, for example, in «p ! ««p the first and
second occurrences of « have modal depth 0, whereas the third oc-
currence of « has modal depth 1. The cumulative reduction to essence
says the following: (i) where «n is an occurrence of « with modal
depth n, «np reduces to 9xxn8yynðyynvxxn ^ «xx0txx1t:::txxnpÞ, (ii)
given any formula containing any number of metaphysical necessity
operators, we apply this procedure on each operator to arrive at a new
formula, and then the cumulative reduction to essence says that the
proposition expressed by the former formula reduces to the propos-
ition expressed by the latter.
What is the vision behind this cumulative reduction to essence? The
crucial change in this reduction to essence is the extra pluralities of
objects we’re allowed to look at in formulas with iterated necessity
operators when trying to find an essence in which to source p. In
particular, we can now consider the plurality containing any objects
we see in the course of evaluating the formula (I’ve called the reduc-
tion ‘cumulative’ because the objects we’re allowed to look at can only
increase with each successive iteration of « ). Picturesquely, the cu-
mulative reduction allows us to keep track of which objects we’ve
already seen as we move across modal space, and to look back at
those objects’ essences even if we’ve moved to possibilities at which
those objects fail to be something. Notice that with formulas contain-
ing only occurrences of « with modal depth 0, the cumulative reduc-
tion to essence doesn’t differ from the canonical reduction to essence
we’ve been discussing throughout. So the new reduction comes into
its own only when we look at formulas containing modal operators
which are themselves in the scope of other modal operators. For
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example, applying the reduction to ««p we get: 9xx08yy0ðyy0vxx0^
«xx0ð9xx18yy1ðyy1vxx1 ^ «xx0txx1pÞÞÞ.
The cumulative reduction to essence avoids both our argument
from S4 and our argument from B above, because when we move
to possibilities where something contained in xx fails to be something
(because it’s consistent with the essences of what there is that some-
thing contained in xx fails to be something), we can still consider xx’s
essence when determining what’s necessary or possible at these pos-
sibilities. Another way to put this point is that the cumulative reduc-
tion to essence implies non-standard contingentism, which we already
know avoids our arguments. So we have here a reduction to essence
that lets us keep contingentism, S5, and () too.
Though it is an interesting way to modify the reduction to essence,
the cumulative reduction is ultimately problematic, and so doesn’t
offer an attractive response to our arguments. Right away notice
that the reduction arguably doesn’t answer the question that drives
the literature on reductions of modality to begin with, namely, ‘what is
it to be necessary?’. Extant reductions from the literature take the form
‘a proposition is necessary in virtue of  ’, where ‘’ describes some
non-modal condition that propositions might satisfy (for example,
recall that the canonical reduction to essence says that a proposition
is necessary in virtue of being essential to some xx). By contrast, the
cumulative reduction offers a contextual picture, according to which
the contribution some particular necessity operator « makes to the
reducing non-modal proposition differs depending on how many
other necessity operators embed « (that is, «’s modal depth). As a
result, the cumulative reduction doesn’t allow us to fill in the above
schema without first knowing the modal context in which the neces-
sity operator occurs, because the translation of the operator into es-
sence-theoretic terms can change across modal contexts. So what we
have in the cumulative reduction is a general procedure for reducing
any modal proposition to a non-modal one, rather than a univocal
account of what it is to be necessary given in non-modal terms that
implies such a procedure, as all other extant reductions of modality
provide. However, proponents of the cumulative reduction can justly
point out that I haven’t given any reason to regard the contextual
nature of their story as objectionable. I’m not sure what else there is
to say in response, so I currently view the contextual nature of the
cumulative reduction as unusual, and certainly not what we expected
to find when seeking a reduction of modality, but not as a reason to
dismiss the reduction from the get-go.
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A second worry is that proponents of the cumulative reduction
must hold that any formulas which express the same modal propos-
ition are mapped by the reduction to formulas which express the same
essence-theoretic proposition, or else the cumulative reduction won’t
give a unique reducing proposition in terms of essence for each modal
proposition. Whether this commitment is problematic depends on
how fine-grained one takes these propositions to be; we won’t explore
the wealth of options here, but it’s not hard to point to some attractive
combinations of views which the commitment rules out. For instance,
proponents of the cumulative reduction arguably can’t hold that ««p
expresses the same proposition as 9qððq ¼ «pÞ ^ «qÞ, because the
latter formula contains only occurrences of « with modal depth 0,
whereas in the former formula the second occurrence of « has modal
depth 1 (an exception would be proponents of the cumulative reduc-
tion with very coarse-grained views according to which the different
essence-theoretic formulas that arise from this difference in modal
depth nonetheless express the same proposition).
This previous example also points to a more general problem: ar-
guably proponents of the cumulative reduction must privilege certain
means of expressing various modal principles over others (roughly
those formulas where the modal depth of each operator in the formula
matches the ‘intuitive depth’ of the modality that operator contributes
to the proposition expressed). For instance, we would standardly take
««p and 9qððq ¼ «pÞ ^ «qÞ to be equally legitimate ways to express
that p is necessarily necessary. Yet only ««p allows the extra compo-
nents of the cumulative reduction that help avoid our arguments to
kick in (because only it contains an operator with modal depth greater
than 0). By contrast, 9qððq ¼ «pÞ ^ «qÞ gets mapped by the cumula-
tive reduction to an essence-theoretic formula that’s necessarily
equivalent to the formula that ««p gets mapped to by the canonical
reduction (recall that the cumulative reduction agrees with the canon-
ical reduction when we’re dealing only with occurrences of « that
have modal depth 0, and so agrees with the canonical reduction
about 9qððq ¼ «pÞ ^ «qÞ). Thus the cumulative reduction has more
resources than the canonical reduction to answer our argument from
S4 only if we somehow privilege formulas like ««p as expressions of p
being necessarily necessary over formulas like 9qððq ¼ «pÞ ^ «qÞ.
Generalizing from this example, the cumulative reduction avoids
our initial arguments only given certain choices of formulas for ex-
pressing various modal principles over other natural choices (pictur-
esquely, we must privilege those formulas whose surface syntax
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mirrors the modal doctrine we’re trying to express), because whether
the cumulative reduction lets us keep track of which objects we’ve
already seen, and so whether it does any better than the canonical
reduction as concerns our arguments, is sensitive to these syntactic
distinctions. I don’t see how the cumulative reduction can do without
this problematic commitment to privileged formulas, given that the
reduction of some modal proposition is intimately tied to which for-
mula we take to express that proposition.
We have in the cumulative reduction a general procedure for redu-
cing any modal proposition to a non-modal essence-theoretic prop-
osition. I find the contextual nature of the cumulative reduction
problematic, though I’ve said enough to show only that a contextual
reduction isn’t what we traditionally had in mind when asking for a
reduction of modality. Nonetheless, having to privilege certain means
of expressing each modal proposition strikes me as objectionable bag-
gage to take on, and a sign that something has gone wrong. For those
sympathetic to reducing modality to essence and less worried about
these features, the cumulative reduction may offer an attractive re-
sponse to our arguments, and indeed an independently interesting
modification of the canonical reduction to essence.
5. Conclusion
As I said from the outset, my main goal here has been to rigorously
bring out the tension between our initial popular doctrines and ex-
plore the pros and cons of various morals we might take away from
our arguments, rather than point to some reply as the one we should
adopt moving forward in light of our results. If forced to go one way
or the other, I lean towards either the first or third concessive replies
from §4.1: either embracing necessitism or taking our arguments to
vindicate the strong conclusion that we should abandon the general
project of trying to reduce metaphysical modality to essence, whether
via the canonical reduction to essence or some alternative. I lean to-
wards one of these two options because (i) I’m convinced by the
problems I brought out for both modifications of the canonical re-
duction to essence that we discussed, and I’m not sure how else one
might modify the reduction to essence so as to avoid our arguments,
(ii) I think non-standard contingentism is unmotivated, and (iii) I
take at least the theorems of B, and likely also the theorems of S4, and
hence the theorems of S5, as non-negotiable constraints governing
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metaphysical modality (putting aside general reasons to be sceptical of
the ideology of metaphysical modality, as we’ve done throughout).
Still, even if I’m wrong about where the balance of considerations is
pointing, all of the responses we looked at embody controversial meta-
physical theses, so no matter which way we go our arguments will have
led to some striking conclusions.
Let me close by courting some controversy. A theme which has been
in the background throughout our discussion is that perhaps we don’t
have as good a grip on Fine’s non-modal notion of essence as some
have thought. My own view is that the current evidence suggesting we
have anything approaching a workable understanding of the notion of
essence is thin: the ideology is motivated by a few paradigm cases and
picturesque glosses that underdetermine how essence behaves in more
interesting cases (the difficulty we saw in saying much informative
either way about iterated essentialist claims when discussing ()
being just one symptom of this issue). Of course, I haven’t said
enough to establish this grandiose claim, but our discussion takes us
some way towards it, especially if I’m right about the way forward in
light of our results. Reducing metaphysical modality is a central role
for the ideology of essence, and one it’s called on again and again to
play. If we hold this role fixed, then we perhaps gain a lever in forming
principled judgements about what’s essential to what, by reasoning
downwards from independently motivated claims involving meta-
physical modality (again assuming that the ideology of metaphysical
modality is in good standing, as we’ve done throughout, though I view
this as an open issue). So, by lending some support to the conclusion
that we shouldn’t think essence has any role to play in reducing meta-
physical modality, our discussion calls into question this lever that
might have put essence on firmer epistemological footing, and so our
discussion takes us at least a little bit towards the sceptical claim about
the status of the ideology of essence itself.12
12 My greatest debts are to Cian Dorr and Tim Williamson, for extremely helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts of the paper, and for being continual sources of guidance and encour-
agement. I also owe huge thanks to Andreas Ditter, Kit Fine, Jeremy Goodman, Marko Malink,
Jake Nebel, as well as the two anonymous referees and two editors from Mind, all of whom
provided comments on earlier drafts of the paper that led to substantial changes. Finally, for
helpful comments and discussions about the paper and related issues, thanks to Dave
Chalmers, Brian Cutter, Boris Kment, Annina Loets, Adam Lovett, Jonathan Schaffer, and
the audience at NYU’s ‘Washington Square Circle’ work in progress seminar.
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